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The development of the Internet presents unprecedented opportuni-
ties for global communications and commerce. However, it also poses
dramatic risks to personal privacy.' The series of electronic footprints
created when a Web user moves about in cyberspace, commonly called a
"clickstream," can be monitored and recorded by prying eyes. This data
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1. See Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609,
1610-11 (1999) ("[nformation technology in cyberspace also affects privacy in ways that
are dramatically different from anything previously possible. By generating comprehensive
records of online behavior, information technology can broadcast an individual's secrets in
ways that he or she can neither anticipate nor control. Once linked to the Internet, the com-
puter on our desk becomes a potential recorder and betrayer of our confidences.").
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can then be "mined" for information and used to profile a Web user or to
recreate her online experience.
A significant Fourth Amendment question is raised when the prying
eyes monitoring a clickstrean belong to law enforcement officers: does
a Net user retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in his or her click-
stream data? Unfortunately, traditional Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence is ill-suited to answer this question.2
This Article argues that Web users should enjoy a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in clickstream data. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
as developed over the last half-century does not support an expectation
of privacy. However, reference to the history of the Fourth Amendment
and the intent of its drafters reveals that government investigation and
monitoring of clickstream data is precisely the type of activity the Fram-
ers sought to limit. Courts must update outdated methods of expectation
of privacy analysis to address the unique challenges posed by the Inter-
net in order to fulfill the Amendment's purpose.
Part I provides an overview of the Internet and cickstream data col-
lection, and explains the value of this data to law enforcement. Part II
discusses general Fourth Amendment principles, then explores how
these principles have been, and are likely to be, applied to the Internet.
Part III explores the intent of the Fourth Amendment's drafters, analo-
gizes clickstream searches to the general searches the Framers sought to
prohibit, and argues that the values underlying the Fourth Amendment
require courts to eschew the traditional two-prong expectation of privacy
test in favor of a normative inquiry which recognizes a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in clickstream data?
I. THE INTERNET AND CLICKSTREAM DATA COLLECTION
The Internet is a global electronic communications medium com-
prised of innumerable computer networks which communicate by using
a common language and set of data transfer protocols.4 The Internet is
2. See, e.g., United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 508 (W.D. Va. 1999)
("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very structure, a computer and telephone net-
work that connects millions of users, defies traditional Fourth Amendment analysis.").
3. While clickstream monitoring and data mining technology are still in their infancy,
courts must frequently lay the groundwork for future laws without the benefit of foresight into
future technological advancement. Accordingly, this Article assumes that data storage and
processing technology will in the near future allow mass processing and sorting of clickstream
information.
4. The Federal Networking Council defines "Intemet" as "the global information sys-
tem that-(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the
Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support commu-
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not a location; rather, it is the aggregate of the electronic communica-
tions routers and devices which transmit and receive electronic
information through the global network. Originally conceived during the
Cold War as a means by which to insure continuity in military commu-
nications during wartime, the modern Internet has brought hundreds of
millions of people together online. While the exact number of Internet
users is impossible to determine, it is estimated that nearly 300 million
people worldwide are currently online These users can travel among
the five million active Web sites on the Net 6 The growth of this medium
over the past five years has been explosive,7 and promises to continue at
nications using the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its sub-
sequent extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii) provides, uses
or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services layered on the communi-
cations and related infrastructure described herein." FNC Resolution: Definition of "Internet, "
(last modified October 30, 1995) <http://www.fnc.gov/Intemetres.html>. See also Stephan
K. Bayens, The Search and Seizure of Computers: Are We Sacrificing Personal Privacy for
the Advancement of Technology?, 48 DRAKE L. REv. 239, 248-49 (2000) (" 'The Internet is
not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network which interconnects innumerable
smaller groups of linked computer networks.' The Internet is an overwhelming mass of in-
formation that has no centralized administrator, storage location, or control point. 'It exists
and functions as a result of the fact that hundreds of thousands of separate operators of
computers and computer networks independently decided to use common data transfer
protocols to exchange communications and information with other computers (which in
turn exchange communications and information with still other computers).'") (footnotes
omitted). For a good overview of the way the Internet works, see Schwartz, supra note 1,
at 1618-21. See also Overview of the World Wide Web (visited March 2, 2000) <http:l
www.cio.comWebMaster/sem2_home.html>; The World Wide Web for the Clueless
<http:llwww.cio.comWebMaster/sem2.simple-pieces.html>.
5. Nua Internet Surveys: How Many Online? (visited April 21, 2000)
<http:llwww.nua.ie/surveyslhow.-manyonline/index.hml> (estimating 304.36 million Inter-
net users as of March 2000); Global Reach: Global Internet Statistics (last modified March
31, 2000) <http:/vww.glreach.com/globstatslindex.php3> (estimating 288 million Internet
users worldwide).
6. Nua Internet Surveys: Netcraft: 5 Million Web Sites on the TVWW (last modified
April 20, 1999) <http://www.nua.ie/surveys/index.cgi?f=VS&art_id=905354851&rel=true>
("Just two years ago the Netcraft survey counted I million web sites on the Web, the latest
survey finds that there are now over 5 million web sites."). See also Domainstats.com (last
modified April 6, 2000) <http://www.domainstats.com> (recognizing 15,719,462 registered
domain names worldwide).
7. See Computer Industry Almanac Inc.: Over 150 Million Internet Users Worldwide at
Year-end 1998 (last modified April 30, 1999) <http://www.c-i-a.com/199904iu.htm> ("April
30, 1999-According to the Computer Industry Almanac Inc. there were over 150 million
Internet users at year-end 1998-up from 61 million Internet users at year-end 1996."); Nua
Internet Surveys: Netcraft, supra note 6 ("Just two years ago the Netcraft survey counted I
million web sites on the Web, the latest survey finds that there are now over 5 million web
sites."); Headcount.com: Who's online by country: The World (visited March 19, 2000)
<http://www.headcount.com/count/datafind.htm?choice=country&choicev%5B%5D=The+V
orld&submit=Submit> ("In June 1998, Matrix Information and Directory Services (MIDS)
reported that there are 102 million accessing the Internet in the world. This number is esti-
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a rapid pace well into the twenty-first century. Recent estimates show
the number of people going online during the next two years approach-
ing one billion, and show the value of Internet commerce swelling to
over $1 trillion by 2003.
Unfortunately, Web surfing generates a massive amount of personal
information about a user each time he or she goes online.9 Net users of-
ten operate under an illusion of anonymity in cyberspace. However, the
reality of the Internet is much different: prying eyes can identify indi-
vidual users and track online activity by monitoring and examining
"clickstreams." A "clickstream" is the aggregation of the electronic in-
formation generated as a Web user communicates with other computers
and networks over the Internet.'l The name "clickstream" refers to the
series of mouse clicks users make as they travel the Web. Each click
translates into an electronic signal which is then sent by the surfer's
computer to other computers on the Net telling them what information to
return to the user. Since online movement requires the user to send or
request certain information from other computers on the Web, every step
in cyberspace inevitably becomes part of the clickstream record." This
mated as of January 1998 and has increased from the estimate of 57 million in January
1997.").
8. See Headcount.com, supra note 7 ("MIDS [Matrix Information and Directory Serv-
ices] estimates that the total number of worldwide Internet users will grow to 707 million by
2001."); Internet Commerce Will Rocket to More Than $1 Trillion by 2003, According
to IDC (last modified June 28, 1999) <http://www.idc.com/Data/Internet/contentl
NET062899PR.htm> ("In recent market research, International Data Corporation (IDC) re-
ports the amount of commerce conducted over the World Wide Web will top a staggering $1
trillion by 2003.").
9. Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy: General Practices and
Concerns (last modified September 15, 1997) <http:llwww.ftc.gov/reports/privacy/
privacy3.htm> ("The Internet is a highly decentralized, global network of electronic networks.
It is unique among communications media in the variety and depth of personal information
generated by its use.").
10. Eric Johnson, An Examination of the Role of Clickstream Data in Marketing
through the Internet (last modified May 12, 1997) <http'//www.ftc.govbcplprivacy/wkshp97/
comments2ljohnsonO.htm> n.l("A formal definition of 'clickstream' data, according to CASIE, the
Consortium for Advertising Supported Information and Entertainment: 'The database created by
the date-stamped and time-stamped, coded/interpreted, button-pushing events enacted by users of
interactive media, controlling their systems via remote control channel changers, alphanumeric PC
keyboards and mice, numeric keyboards of PDAs and similar devices, and voice command of
screen media.' "). See also JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTER-
NET: FoRMs AND ANALYSIS § 10.02(l)(a) (1999) ("As an individual user browses the
Internet, a trail of electronic information is left at Web sites he or she visits. [This
i]nformation about the path a user takes through the Internet, called 'clickstream' data, can be
collected and sorted.").
11. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1620 ('The Internet's technical qualities also have a nega-
tive consequence: they make possible an intense surveillance of activities in cyberspace.
Digital reality is constructed through agreement about technical norms. This 'code,' to use
Lawrence Lessig's term, creates cyberspace. As a result of cyberspace code, surfing and other
[Vol. 6:61
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data can be shockingly revealing, providing a record of the entirety of
one's online experience, including movements among Web sites, geo-
graphical location, the type of computer and Internet browser in use, and
any transactions or comments made at individual Web sites.
2
Clickstream data poses a dramatic risk to the personal privacy of Net
users since it can be collected, stored, and reused indefinitely. 3 An in-
creasing number of private companies are monitoring, recording, and
analyzing clickstreams in an effort to make Internet advertising more
effective. This data is typically collected by online advertisers and retail-
ers, and by Internet service providers ("ISPs").14 Most online advertisers
cyberspace behavior generate finely granulated data about an individual's activities-often
without her permission or even knowledge.") (footnotes omitted).
12. See Center for Democracy & Technology: CDT's guide to online privacy (visited
February 23, 2000) <http:llwww.cdt.org/privacy/guide/start> ("Use of the network, how-
ever, generates detailed information about the individual-revealing where they "go" on
the Net (via URLs), who they associate with (via list-servs, chat rooms and news
groups), and how they engage in political activities and social behavior."); Jerry Berman &
Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA. L. REV. 551,
554 (1999) ("The data trail, known as transactional data, left behind as individuals use the
Internet is a rich source of information about their habits of association, speech, and com-
merce. Transactional data, click stream data, or 'mouse droppings,' as it is alternatively
called, can include the Internet protocol address ('IP address') of the individual's com-
puter, the browser in use, the computer type, and what the individual did on previous visits
to the Web site, or perhaps even other Web sites."); Damien Cave, Salon.com: Do
They Know Where You Live? (last modified February 28, 2000) <http:ll
www.salon.com/techlfeature/2000/02128/geographiclindex.html> ("Ad-serving companies
like Double Click offer services that they say can target ads to users by location. And Digital
Island introduced technology last year called TraceWare, which can identify the location of
Web site visitors with 96 percent accuracy. TraceWare works by scanning worldwide traffic
as it passes through ISPs, then matching users' IP addresses with a database of IP address
locations that Digital Island has built.").
13. See Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy, supra note 9 ("When
users browse on the World Wide Web ('the Web'), for example, they leave an electronic
marker at each site (or on each page within a site) they visit. The series of electronic markers,
or 'clickstream' generated by each user's browsing activities can be aggregated, stored, and
re-used."); Center for Democracy & Technology: CDT's guide to online privacy, supra note
12 ("Some of the newest tracking tools can so efficiently mine and manipulate the data trail
(or 'clickstream') people leave behind when they use the Internet that they build a detailed
database of peronal [sic] information without any human intervention."); Jerry Berman &
Deirdre Mulligan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA. L. REv. 551, 554
(1999) (explaining that clickstream data "is captured at various points on the network and
available for reuse and disclosure."); JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE
INTERNET: Fonis AND ANALYSIS § l0.02(1)(a) (1999) ("[C]lickstream data [] can be col-
lected and stored.").
14. An Internet service provider, or ISP, is the portal which provides access to the Inter-
net for individuals, educational institutions, companies, and organizations. A Net user dials
into the ISP using his or her PC and a modem; the ISP then connects the user to the Internet.
See Stephen Jenkins, Glossary of PC and Internet Terminology (last modified January 9,
2000) <http:/lhomepages.enterprise.netljenko/Glossary/G.htm> ("Internet Service Provider or
sometimes referred to as Internet Access Provider (IAP) is a company which provides access
1999-2000]
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and merchants can monitor clickstreams only while a user is at the par-
ticular Web site operated by the advertiser or retailer; however, even this
data can be incredibly revealing."' Some online advertisers have devel-
oped "networks" of hundreds of unrelated Web sites which use
individual identifying codes to identify and track Web users' click-
streams as they travel among the sites on the network.16 The data
compiled by these businesses is then "mined" for hints about consumer
to the Internet for people like you & me. The company handles the link from your PC to the
rest of the Internet. The ISP's central computer is linked to the rest of the internet so the per-
son using this service only pays the telephone charges to connect from their home computer to
the ISP's central computer."); UGeek Technical Glossary (last modified April 26, 1999)
<http:llwww.geek.com/glossary/glossary-search.cgi?i> ("Internet Service Provider (ISP)-
An ISP provides Internet access to people or corporations. ISPs generally have pools of mo-
dems awaiting dial-up connections.")
15. See Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy, supra note 9 ("Each
Web site, in turn, captures certain information about users as they enter the site. A Web site
can 'know' users' email addresses, the names of their browsers, the type of computer they are
using, and the universal resource locator (URL), or Internet address of the site from which
they linked to the current site.... Clickstream data also permits Internet site owners to under-
stand activity levels at various areas within sites, in a manner analogous to a retail store's
practice of checking inventory."); Millstein, supra note 11 ("Web sites, for instance, often
have the capability to automatically log information about users. A Web site may be able to
determine a user's e-mail address, the type of computer and browsing software being used,
and the address of the Web site from which the user linked. The Web pages or files a user
accessed while browsing a Web site-and how long the user remained on a particular
Web page-can also be recorded."); Peter McGrath, Newsweek: Knowing You All Too
Well (last modified March 29, 1999) <http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/
ty0 113_2.htm> ("Your clickstream reveals your interests and tastes with unnerving precision.
(Did you go from slate.com to a Volvo dealer's Web site? Did you then buy some brie from
peapod.com, the online grocery? You may be one of those limousine liberals we've been
hearing about.) And when Web merchants combine clickstream analysis with another new
software technique known as 'collaborative filtering,' which makes educated inferences about
your likes and dislikes based on comparing your user profile with others in the database, they
have a marketing tool of high potential not only for customer satisfaction but also for
abuse."); Eric Wieffering, Protecting your digital footprints, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIu., No-
vember 7, 1999, at 1D ("[O]nline, every mouse-click within a particular site can be tracked
and analyzed. Even on sites where you're not required to volunteer personal information, a
Web site operator can log your computer's address and know approximately where you've
come from. It can then follow you around the site, recording which features and links you
clicked on and how long you lingered there, and create a complete profile that it can use to
determine what kind of advertising and products you will see."). See also Beth Givens, Pri-
vacy Rights Clearinghouse: The Emperor's New Clothes: Privacy on the Internet in 1999 (last
modified June 21, 1999) <http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/emporor.htn> (reporting results of
Georgetown University's McDonough School of Business May 1999 Internet Privacy Policy
Survey, and noting that "the collection of personally identifiable information has become
standard practice on a vast majority of commercial web sites.").
16. Hiawatha Bray, Boston Globe: Matching Ads to Eyeballs (last modified February 22,
2000) <http://www.boston.com/dallyglobe2/053/business/Matching-adstoeyeballsP.shtml>
(describing Engage online user tracking network which coordinates numerous Web sites in
tracking user clickstreams, thereby allowing Engage to compile detailed user profile, and ex-
plaining that Engage network has already tracked over 35 million online users.).
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preferences, and may be used to generate personal profiles of surfers in
order to target Internet advertising.
7
In contrast, ISPs can precisely monitor and record an entire click-
stream since all of the user's online commands are sent through the
ISP.' This data can be combined with information the user voluntarily
provides to the ISP to create a massive database detailing the online use
habits of individually-identifiable suffers. 9 Such monitoring is becoming
17. Jesse Berst, ZDNet AnchorDesk: The Good, Bad, and Ugly of Personalization (last
modified November 2, 1999) <http:/lwww.zdnet.comlanchordesklstory/story_4050.html>
("Personalization is a huge trend on the Web. Sites create user profiles by identifying you
each time you come to a site, recording your preferences, and then delivering ads and content
targeted to your profile.... [T]he typical profile can contain: Explicit information. This is
what you voluntarily reveal when registering at a site or signing up for a service. Your name,
email address, etc. Implicit information. This is data the site gathers by monitoring your click
stream-what you do, where you go. From that it infers what your interests are."); John M.
Broder, Making America Safe for Electronic Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1997, at 4D
("Those [clickstream] records provide invaluable information for marketers who can use them
to pinpoint customers for their products. By following your Internet 'clickstream,' they can
learn about your medical condition, your reading habits, your political predilections.").
18. In this way, the ISP's role can be analogized to that of an interpreter in court pro-
ceedings. Since everything passes through the interpreter en route to its intended destination,
the interpreter has access to all of the party's statements.
19. Roger Taylor, FTC clicks on to fears over data on web users, FIN. TIMES (London),
April 5, 1999, at 5 ("At present there is no privacy on the Internet. Internet service providers
know an individual user's name and address and can track every single move the user makes
on the web. And the information is held on record .. "); Jeffrey Pollock, A Tangled Web-
Thoughts for a Law Firm Using the Web, 198 AUG-N.J. LAw. 18-19 (1999) ("Virtually all
netizens (Internet users for the uninitiate) access the Net through an ISP. As you are searching
your way merrily along the strands of the WWW, however, your friendly ISP is collecting
information regarding where you've been. The information captured is called a 'click stream'
and records every website you've visited."); James F. Brelsford & Nicole A. Wong, Online
Liability Issues: Defamation, Privacy and Negligent Publishing, 564 PLIIPAT. 231, 244
(1999) ("Clickstream Data. While a user 'surfs' the Internet, each web site visited and each
page viewed are typically logged by the user's Internet Service Provider. The ISP may main-
tain a record of a user's email communications and other online activities, including Web sites
visited, purchases made, and more."); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1627 ("ISPs are in an ad-
vantageous position to tie together the information that exists about anyone who surfs the
Web ... mhe ISP has detailed information about the Internet behavior of each of its custom-
ers. Through its role as an entrance ramp to the Internet, the ISP gains access to clickstream
data and other kinds of detailed information about personal online habits. It can easily take
these scattered bits of cyberspace data, pieces of which at times enjoy different degrees of
practical obscurity, and make them into 'personal information' by linking them to the identity
of its customers."); David Whalen, The Unofficial Cookie FAQ v. 2.53, (last modified May
10, 1999) <http://www.cooldecentral.com/faq/index.shtml> ("The very nature of Web servers
allows for the tracking of your surfing habits .... ); Center for Democracy & Technology:
CDT's guide to online privacy, supra note 12 ("Over the past two decades the Internet has
grown into a semi-autonomous network where anonymity has been honored. Use of the net-
work, however, generates detailed information about the individual-revealing where they
"go" on the Net (via URLs), who they associate with (via list-servs, chat rooms and news
groups), and how they engage in political activities and social behavior. Some of the newest
tracking tools can so efficiently mine and manipulate the data trail (or 'clickstream') people
1999-2000]
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increasingly common.2 Unfortunately, the massive data collection re-
garding a user's online behavior and habits is performed largely sub
21rasa, occurring without the user's knowledge or consent.
Clickstream data gathered by ISPs and online
companies could be a fertile source of information for law enforce-
ment. Law enforcement agents could analyze clickstream
data7 for evidence of crime or digital contraband2 Such
leave behind when they use the Internet that they build a detailed database of peronal [sic]
information without any human intervention.").
20. Charles Babcock, ZDNet Interactive Week: Problems Surface With Data Mining
(last modified February 2, 1999) <http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/
0,4164,388207,00.html> ("Businesses' desire to generate online customer relationships is a
mighty engine in the new electronic economy. It is prompting pioneering businesses, such as
Internet service providers, to engage in extensive data mining to individualize the otherwise
faceless customer base.... A young and aggressive ISP will mine other forms of customer
data that falls into its hands in order to buttress the customer relationship and retain custom-
ers, according to Larry Goldman, a customer relationship management expert at Braun
Technology Group.").
21. Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy, supra note 9 ("The fact
that online information-gathering is automated means that it is invisible to the user and often
takes place without the user's knowledge and consent."); Center for Democracy & Technol-
ogy: CDT's guide to online privacy: Terms (visited February 23, 2000) <http:#
www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/terms> ('The collection of personal information online occurs in
two ways. First, information is collected through your active provision of information, such as
when you purchase a product online or when you join as a member of a web site. Second,
while you are engaged in 'passive' online activity-for example when you are lurking in chat
rooms, reading bulletin boards, or browsing through online resources-your personal infor-
mation is also being collected and possible stored, all under your illusion of anonymity.");
Erika S. Koster, Zero Privacy: Personal Data on the Internet, 16 No. 5 COMPUTER LAW. 7, 7
(1999) ("New technology and more powerful computers now make it possible, without the
visitor's knowledge, for companies to record and track information about visitors to their Web
sites .... ); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1621-22 ("Visitors to cyberspace sometimes believe
that they will be fully able to choose among anonymity, semi-anonymity, and complete dis-
closure of identity and preferences. Yet, in each of the three areas, finely granulated personal
data are created-often in unexpected ways. Moreover, most people are unable to control, and
are often in ignorance of, the complex processes by which their personal data are created,
combined, and sold.").
22. The fact that the data may be stored in computers owned by the ISP or another busi-
ness does not prevent a Web user from retaining a legitimate expectation in the information
since the "capacity to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a
property right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a
reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion." Mancusi v. DeForte, 392
U.S. 364, 368 (1968). Accordingly, the question is whether the user has a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in not being tracked online, not whether he or she retains an expectation of
privacy in his ISP's computers.
23. The range of crimes committed on or facilitated by the Internet is virtually limitless.
See, e.g., Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protection
for Internet Communication, 110 HARV. L. Rav. 1591, 1591 (1997) (hereinafter "Keeping
Secrets") ("Some crimes actual occur in cyberspace: people can illegally download copy-
righted software, gamble, or view obscene photographs. The Internet has facilitated other
criminal acts, such as kidnapping, hate crimes, and illegal drug sales. Dangerous information,
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searches24 could be generalized, scanning all clickstreams for evidence of
illegal activity,2' or limited to a specific suspect at a specific time and
cyber-location.2 ' Law enforcement officers who obtain this data from an
ISP or online business would have a powerful investigative tool at their
disposal: a record of the entirety of a suspect's online experience. This
data would dramatically promote the efficacy and efficiency of police
investigation into crimes consummated in or facilitated by cyberspace.
Officers could track every step a Net surfer takes from the moment she
logs on until she logs off, and could note each site visited, how long she
stayed there, whom she "chatted" with, and what she downloaded.2
Surfers who download child pornography or recipes for methampheta-
mine or explosives could be easily identified, allowing officers to
improve the accuracy of "real world" investigations.
such as how to build bomb, infiltrate computer security systems, forge credit cards and phone
cards, pick locks, or kill people with one's bare hands is readily lavailable."); Brian Simon,
Note, The Tangled Web We Weave: The Internet and Standing Under the Fourth Amendment,
21 NoVA L. REv. 941, 959 (1997) ("Aside from hacking, various forms of computer crime
now exist. Criminals upload viruses in an attempt to destroy computer systems, steal copy-
righted material, and engage in the exchange of child pornography amongst other thing.
Private files exist which contain evidence of crime occurring outside cyberspace (the dreaded
physical world).").
24. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is somewhat inconsistent in its use of the term
"search." The most widespread school of thought is that a search occurs "when an expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed." United States v. Jacob-
sen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). I do not mean to put the cart before the horse by using the
phrase "clickstream search" in my analysis. Instead, I use the term "search" in its plain
meaning sense to describe the act of monitoring, examining, or analyzing clickstream data,
regardless of whether the Web user ultimately retains a legitimate expectation of privacy.
25. Such a broad search might prove difficult in practice due to the massive amounts of
clickstream data generated by Net surfers; even a short online session can generate millions of
bytes of information. However, while technological barriers may currently prevent police
from conducting a dragnet clickstream, the danger of such searches is becoming increasingly
real as data collection and processing technology rapidly advances. Furthermore, law en-
forcement agencies have empirically shown themselves willing to sort through large amounts
of innocuous information in order to unearth evidence of a crime. See, e.g., Eversole v. Steele,
59 F.3d 710, 713 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing efforts of regional drug task force to enforce
state anti-narcotics laws by monitoring and logging all drug store sales and pharmacy records
in a four-county area to determine whether any customers purchased more than four ounces of
cough syrup containing codeine within any given forty-eight hour period). Importantly, the'
difficulty of such a search will undoubtedly be lessened as technology advances, thereby
heightening the risk to Net users.
26. The scope of any actual search is irrelevant for purposes of this article. The question
is whether a Web user enjoys an expectation of privacy in his or her clickstream. If he or she
does not, then a generalized "dragnet" search and a specific targeted search are equally per-
missible. If he or she retains an expectation of privacy, then the scope of the search is relevant
in determining whether the intrusion occasioned by the search is reasonable. However, that
inquiry is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
27. See supra notes 12, 15, and 19, and accompanying text.
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In addition, law enforcement agents could mine clickstream data to
create psychological profiles for use at trial to establish intent or motive.
Online businesses already use clickstream data to profile users in an ef-
fort to determine what types of products a particular user is likely to
purchase.2 Law enforcement using the same data could compile a dos-
sier of a defendant's online behavior replete with potentially
incriminating "evidence." 29 For example, the clickstream of a defendant
on trial for possession of child pornography could be potentially damn-
ing if it showed significant amounts of time spent in cyberspace
searching for or viewing pornography. Similarly, a defendant accused of
murdering his wife to inherit her assets might be condemned by a click-
stream that recorded recent research into "manslaughter" inheritance
statutes or intestacy schemes. A third example: the clickstream of a de-
fendant on trial for conspiracy to blow up a government building which
logged an excessive amount of time spent on anti-government militia
Web sites could provide strong evidence of association or intent.
Although the goals of promoting the accuracy and efficiency of
criminal investigations and prosecutions are certainly laudable, courts
must take caution in pursuing them in cyberspace. Police discovery of
"real world" contraband would certainly be more expeditious if general
suspicionless searches of residences were allowed; however, the text of
the Fourth Amendment specifically prohibits such searches.30 General
searches of clickstream data should likewise be forbidden. The danger in
Internet criminal law is that courts will rigidly adhere to outdated Fourth
Amendment concepts which are ill-suited to cyberspace, leading to the
conclusion that Web users lack legitimate expectations of privacy in
clickstream data.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE INTERNET
A. A Brief Overview of the Fourth Amendment's Expectation
of Privacy and Reasonableness Requirements
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
28. See supra notes 15, 17, and 19, and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Koster, supra note 21, at 7 ("Psychographic profiles can be made by ana-
lyzing a Web surfer's 'click stream,' or listing of sites visited."); Berman & Mulligan, supra
note 12, at 554 ("The data trail, known as transactional data, left behind as individuals use the
Internet is a rich source of information about their habits of association, speech, and com-
merce.... Along with information intentionally revealed through purchasing or registration
activities, this transactional data can provide a 'profile' of an individual's activities.").
30. See infra notes 83-100, and accompanying text.
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searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.'
As an initial matter, a defendant raising a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to a government search or seizure must show that he or she is
entitled to the Amendment's protections by establishing a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy that was infringed upon by the government's
actions.32 The legitimate expectation of privacy test traditionally entails a
two-part inquiry: (1) whether the defendant had an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether society is prepared to recognize
that expectation as reasonable.33 In analyzing the second question,
"'[t]he test of legitimacy is not whether the individual chooses to con-
ceal assertedly "private" activity,' but instead 'whether the government's
intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the
Fourth Amendment.' "4
The existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy is subject to an
important limitation: "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."35 The Supreme
Court subsequently expanded upon this principle, first announced in
Katz v. United States, by holding that a person lacks a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in information which he or she voluntarily provides to a
third party, even if that information is provided in confidence or for
business purposes.
If a defendant establishes a legitimate expectation of privacy, the in-
quiry then becomes whether the government's intrusion upon that
expectation was "reasonable." The first step in this analysis is to deter-
mine whether the intrusion was regarded as an unlawful search and
31. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978).
33. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
34. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83
(1984)).
35. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (defendant lacked legitimate
expectation of privacy in bank records since he exposed information in records to bank em-
ployees); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (defendant lacked legitimate expectation of
privacy in phone numbers dialed from phone since he voluntarily provided the numbers to the
telephone company).
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seizure when the Amendment was framed.37 Where this inquiry yields no
result, courts must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional stan-
dards of reasonableness by weighing the degree to which it intrudes
upon an individual's privacy against the degree to which the search or
seizure is necessary for the promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests.38
B. Application of the Fourth Amendment to the Internet has Thus far
Been Marked by Reliance on Principles Ill-Suited to Cyberspace,
Leading Courts to Conclude that Net Users Lack
an Expectation of Privacy in Online Activity
Very few courts have addressed the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to the Internet. Decisions addressing this topic have focused
on an expectation of privacy in two categories: (1) information know-
ingly passed online to other Web users, and (2) information voluntarily
passed offline to ISPs when signing up for Internet service. Both lines of
authority conclude that Net users lack legitimate expectations of privacy
in the data at issue, either because the information was knowingly ex-
posed to public view or because the Net user assumed the risk that the
recipient would share the information with others.
Courts employing assumption of risk analysis focus on the Supreme
Court's decisions in United States v. Miller9 and Smith v. Maryland.40 In
Miller, the Court held that a bank depositor had no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in transactional records compiled and kept by his bank
because he voluntarily conveyed the financial information to his bank,
and because this information was exposed to bank employees in the or-
dinary course of business.4' According to the Court, "[t]he depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will
be conveyed by that person to another... even if the information is re-
vealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed., 42 The
37. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
38. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995). See also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 ("The Fourth
Amendment is to be construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and sei-
zure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the
interests and rights of individual citizens.").
39. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
40. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
41. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442.
42. Id. at 443. See also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). Miller has been
broadly read as standing for the proposition that a customer has no legitimate expectation of
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Supreme Court similarly employed assumption of risk analysis in Smith
in concluding that a defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the numbers dialed on his telephone. Shortly after being robbed, the
victim of a robbery started receiving harassing phone calls from a man
identifying himself as the robber." Police installed a pen register on
Smith's phone after he became the subject of suspicion, and were
thereby able to log him making a threatening call to the robbery victim.'
Smith moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that use of the pen reg-
ister violated his Fourth Amendment rights.4 The Court rejected Smith's
argument, explaining:
This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.... In Miller, for example, the Court held that a
bank depositor has no "legitimate 'expectation of privacy"' in
financial information "voluntarily conveyed to ... banks and
exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business."
This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner
voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone
company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in the
ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he di-
aled.46
Courts have employed the knowing exposure and the assumption of
risk rationales to deny an expectation of privacy in electronic informa-
tion voluntarily exposed online, such as electronic mail or Internet
postings. 4' The few courts to have considered the issue have held that a
user retains a legitimate expectation of privacy in e-mail while it is in
transmission; however, this expectation evaporates once the e-mail is
privacy in records of his business transactions held or created by a third party. See, e.g.,
United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1993) (reading Miller to include credit card
statements and telephone records regarding defendant kept by various businesses). Miller has
been harshly criticized by commentators. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEI-
zuRn § 2.7(c) at 631 (3d ed. 1996) ("The result reached in Miller is dead wrong, and the
Court's woefully inadequate reasoning does great violence to the theory of Fourth Amend-
ment protection which the Court had developed in Katz.").
43. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 743-44 (citations omitted).
47. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citations omitted).
1999-2000]
74 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
received and read.48 These courts analogize e-mail to postal mail, and
hold that the sender assumes the risk that the recipient will disclose the
contents of the e-mail to law enforcement. 49 As the court in United States
v. Charbonneau5 explained:
E-mail transmissions are not unlike other forms of modem
communication. We can draw parallels from these other medi-
ums. For example, if a sender of first-class mail seals an
envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender can rea-
sonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the
eyes of police absent a search warrant founded upon probable
cause. However, once the letter is received and opened, the des-
tiny of the letter then lies in the control of the recipient of the
letter, not the sender, absent some legal privilege.... Thus an e-
mail message, like a letter, cannot be afforded a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy once that message is received. Moreover, a
sender of e-mail runs the risk that he is sending the message to
an undercover agent.
Courts have also declined to extend Fourth Amendment protection
to electronic postings in Internet chat rooms,5 since the contents of these
communications are knowingly exposed to public view."
48. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997);
Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J.
406,417-18 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
49. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184; Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101; Maxwell, 45
M.J. at 417-18. Commentators have made the same analogy. See, e.g., Keeping Secrets in
Cyberspace, supra note 23, at 1597 ("For example, commentators discussing privacy in cy-
berspace often have compared e-mall to traditional postal mail. Individuals retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in sealed first-class mail sent through the postal system, but because
anyone can read the contents of a postcard, an expectation of privacy in its contents would be
unreasonable and a law enforcement officer's reading it is thus not a search. E-mail, which
'can be accessed or viewed on intermediate computers between the sender and recipient,' may
more closely resemble a postcard than a letter in this regard.") (footnotes omitted).
50. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1177.
51. Id. at 1184 (quoting Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 417).
52. A "chat room" is an Internet site set up to allow Web users to "talk" to each other
over the Internet by typing messages on their keyboard. See Jenkins, supra note 14.
53. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184. See also Raphael Winick, Searches and Sei-
zures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 116 (1994) ("Posting a
message in the publicly accessible areas of a BBS can be viewed as either putting the message
into 'plain view,' or as voluntarily disclosing the information to all other parties. One loses
any expectation of privacy in an otherwise private item by placing the item into plain view.
As a result, outsiders such as law enforcement officials may monitor BBS communications if
those communications are stored or transmitted in a manner that is accessible to the public.
Similarly, voluntary disclosure of information to another permits the other party to relay that
information to law enforcement personnel without offending the Fourth Amendment."); Terri
Cutrera, The Constitution in Cyberspace: The Fundamental Rights of Computer Users, 60
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At least two other courts have concluded that Net users surrender
any expectation of privacy in personal information voluntarily passed to
an ISP when contracting for Internet service.M These courts analyzed the
issue using the assumption of risk analysis developed in Miller and
Smith, and concluded that an Internet user assumes the risk that an ISP
will disclose sign-up information (including name, address, social secu-
rity number, and credit card number) to authorities. 5 Significantly, the
district court in United States v. Hambrick noted that the traditional Katz
expectation of privacy framework was ill-suited for application to cyber-
space; nonetheless, the court applied it to the defendant's motion to
suppress sign-up information obtained by law enforcement from the de-
fendant's ISP, and denied the motion because "employees [of the ISP]
had ready access to these records in the normal course of [the ISP's]
business, for example, in the keeping of its records for billing purposes,
and nothing prevent[ed] [the ISP] from revealing this information to
nongovernmental actors."56
C. Courts Employing Traditional Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence will
Probably Conclude that Net Users Lack a Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy in Clickstream Data
The two-prong Katz expectation of privacy test is ill-suited to cyber-
space since it fails to take into account the unique nature of the Internet.57
UMKC L. REv. 139, 151-52 (1991) (concluding that Net users lack legitimate expectation of
privacy in "computer service's bulletin board files").
54. ISPs routinely collect personal information when a customer signs up for Internet ac-
cess. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1627 ("ISPs are in an advantageous position to tie
together the information that exists about anyone who surfs the Web. First, the ISP has highly
accurate data about the identity of anyone who uses its services. This information is within its
grasp because the ISP generally collects the client's name, address, phone number, and credit
card number at the time it assigns an account.").
55. United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); United States
v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999).
56. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 508 ("Cyberspace is a nonphysical 'place' and its very
structure, a computer and telephone network that connects millions of users, defies traditional
Fourth Amendment analysis. So long as the risk-analysis approach of Katz remains valid,
however, this court is compelled to apply traditional legal principles to this new and continu-
ally evolving technology.").
57. I. Judicial notions of the parameters of Fourth Amendment protection have tradi-
tionally evolved with changing technology. Application of traditional Fourth Amendment
principles to the telephone initially yielded results contrary to a modem understanding of the
Amendment's protection. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated when government agents tapped a
telephone line without a warrant since the phone line was not within one of the protected
zones specified in the text of the Fourth Amendment: persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Forty years later, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court held that warrant-
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Application of this test to clickstreams will almost certainly lead courts
to conclude that Web users lack a legitimate expectation of privacy
based upon two rationales: (1) users lack a subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in their clickstreams due to private monitoring, and (2) any actual
expectation of privacy is objectively unreasonable since Net users as-
sume the risk that their clickstream data will be disclosed to law
enforcement.'g The growing body of authority applying the Fourth
Amendment to email, chat room postings, and ISP sign-up information
shows courts moving in this direction. Only one court has considered the
existence of an expectation of privacy in clickstream data; in a brief
opinion, the Fourth Circuit concluded that an employee could not claim
Fourth Amendment protection for clickstream data generated while at
work because an employment policy put him on notice that his govern-
ment employer was monitoring his Internet use.59 Rigid adherence to the
two-prong Katz expectation of privacy test requires a Net user to estab-
lish a subjective expectation of privacy in her clickstream data as a
prerequisite for Fourth Amendment protection. However, it will ulti-
mately be impossible for Net users to hold such an expectation due to
the lack of privacy protection on the Net.60 As the fact of clickstream
less electronic monitoring of a telephone conversation in a public phone booth constituted an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The shift in the Court's analysis,
from the focus on protecting a "place" in Olmstead to the protection of the "person" in Katz,
was, in part, an acknowledgment that changing technology necessitated new means of con-
stitutional analysis. The unique nature of the Internet again calls for a change in the manner in
which courts evaluate the reasonableness of a search or seizure. See, e.g., Federal Trade
Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy: General Practices and Concerns (September 15,
1997) (visited March 1, 2000) <http:/www.ftc.govlreports/privacy/privacy3.htm> ("It is
unique among communications media in the variety and depth of personal information gener-
ated by its use.").
58. At least one commentator has applied traditional Katz analysis and reached this con-
clusion. See Simon, supra note 23, at 967 ("Hypothetically, if the police used a device to track
where one travels in cyberspace, there is no reason to think that the use of such technology
would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. When one travels along the digital
highway, such movements are knowingly exposed to the public and merit no Fourth Amend-
ment protection. The digital web where a user journeys would be considered the functional
equivalent of the public streets.... As long as a user travels along a public area in cyber-
space, where one can legally view their movements, cyber-tracking devices would not
constitute a search.").
59. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
60. Similarly, the court in Smith recognized that because the use of telephones was so
commonplace, telephone users know or should know that they are disclosing information
(numbers dialed) to the telephone company every time they dial, thereby preventing them
from harboring any subjective expectation of privacy. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
742-43 (1979) ("First, we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of
privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equip-
ment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company
has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their
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monitoring becomes widely known, Net users will be forced to
acknowledge that their transmissions may be monitored by online busi-
nesses or ISPs.6' Instead of leading courts to conclude that clickstream
data should be unprotected, courts should instead conclude that the In-
ternet presents the type of situation envisioned by the Supreme Court in
Smith in which "Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate
index of Fourth Amendment protection." 62
long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.... Although subjective expectations cannot
be scientifically gauged it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these cir-
cumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.").
61. In such a case, clickstream searches might be analogized to searches conducted at
open and obvious fixed checkpoints, such as airport metal detectors. These searches are con-
stitutionally permissible since their open and obvious nature eliminates any subjective
expectation of privacy by giving the subject notice that a search is certain to occur when he or
she enters a controlled area, and because they allow the subject to avoid the search by chang-
ing his or her behavior. See Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 463,
473-74 & n.18 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting "critical difference" between open and
obvious checkpoint searches and other less obvious measures, and discussing permissibility of
metal detector searches). See also McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897, 901 (9th Cir. 1978)
(requirement that the public pass through metal detectors before entering courthouses does not
unreasonably violate privacy expectations because search is obvious and public has choice not
to enter); United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929, 932 (9th Cir. 1973) (no expectation of pri-
vacy infringed upon by airport metal detectors). While facially appealing, this analogy falls to
recognize that a clickstream search is significantly more invasive than a metal detector or
magnetic strip scan. Unlike traditional fixed searches, which look only for particular contra-
band or criminal activity, clickstream monitoring tracks the entirety of an individual's online
activity. This distinction is significant: while an individual can still choose to avoid the search
by "opting out" of Internet use, the extensiveness of the potential search is much more likely
to change an individual's lawful behavior than a metal detector. For example, an outwardly
heterosexual man may be deterred by the prospect of a clickstream search from legally enter-
taining homosexual fantasies online in adult chat rooms for fear of being "outed." Fringe
political groups may become wary of using the Internet to advocate lawful political change
over the Internet, or use the Web to engage in legal fund-raising activity. While these con-
cems are better addressed under the First Amendment than the Fourth, the potential chilling
effect on all types of online behavior illustrates the inadequacy of an analogy to metal detec-
tors or fixed checkpoints since those types of searches are limited to curtailing a particular
illegal activity. See also Keeping Secrets, supra note 23, at 1607-08 ("A free society demands
free discourse, and free discourse requires the ability to communicate privately. If our polity is
to engage in vibrant political debate, if our marketplace of ideas is to remain open to radical
and innovative suggestions, we must ensure that citizens can speak both freely and privately.
Some of our most cherished communications-whispers between lovers, vows between
friends-would be stifled if government officials had unbounded discretion to eavesdrop. This
necessarily private communication has already moved into cyberspace, and by all accounts
will continue to do so in the future. Communication in cyberspace must be protected to the
same extent as is more traditional communication if our advancing communication technology
is to achieve its full potential without the sacrifice of any of the free speech or privacy that we
enjoy today.") (footnotes omitted).
62. Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. See also, Bayens, supra note 4, at 278 ("Even relatively
novice computer users understand that employers, Internet service providers, and hackers can
easily monitor electronic transmissions. However, this recognition should not operate as a bar
to Fourth Amendment protections. Electronic communication in its various forms is a practi-
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Application of the assumption of risk principle to online expectation
of privacy issues is similarly flawed because the principle fails to take
into account the extent of intrusion made possible by clickstream data.
There is a significant qualitative difference between clickstream data and
other types of transactional data routinely provided to third parties in the
course of business. A police officer who learns that a suspect has called
a particular phone number, as in Smith, knows only that a call was made;
the number is content neutral, and does not give the officer a means, to
reconstruct the suspect's conversation. 3 Similarly, an officer who
searches bank records, as in Miller, learns only that transactions were
made, and by whom; he or she does not learn the underlying circum-
stances of the transactions. In contrast, an Internet address, while itself
content neutral, allows an officer to view the same information that the
suspect viewed. The clickstream, a record of a person's cyberspace ac-
tivity, allows officers to entirely recreate an online experience.'
Instead, clickstream data is better analogized to library records
which reveal the titles of books read by library patrons.65 Using such re-
cords, officers could view the same content viewed by the suspect.
Officers could potentially reconstruct the suspect's interactions in the
library by interviewing other patrons or reviewing security camera tapes.
However, even this analogy significantly underestimates the intrusive-
ness of a clickstream search. An Internet user's clickstream reveals not
only what sites were visited, but also for how long each site was visited,
how often each site was re-visited, and which links were followed from
each site. A comparable level of knowledge in the concrete world would
cal necessity despite its inherent dangers. Thus, the judiciary or legislature must acknowledge
this dilemma and formulate appropriate responses.").
63. As the Court noted in Smith, "a pen register differs significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of communications."
442 U.S. at 741.
64. The revealing nature of clickstream data has been recognized by leading online pri-
vacy advocates. See Center for Democracy & Technology: CDT's guide to online privacy:
Terms, supra note 21 ("Personally identifiable transactional data is the information describing
your online activities, including web sites you have visited, whom you have sent email, what
files you have downloaded, and other information revealed in the normal course of using the
Internet. Transactional data differs from the content of a communication in that it is not the
actual substance of your communication, but the information about your communication.
Traditionally, the content of your communications has received greater protections in the law
that [sic] transactional data. Recent developments in the law have given greater protections to
transactional data in that it is just as revealing as the content of your communications.")
(emphasis added).
65. See LaFave, supra note 42, at 633 n.61 (questioning whether officers can access li-
brary records after Miller, and suggesting that disclosure of library use information might
properly take place under "judicial supervision" which regulated the State's activities to
eliminate content bias and required showing that suspect's reading practices were relevant to
criminal act under investigation) (citation omitted).
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require that the officers know not only which books the suspect bor-
rowed, but also when she read the books, how long she spent reading
each book and each page, and the sequence in which she read each book
and each page. Furthermore, clickstream data, unlike the hypothetical
library search, is not subject to poor witness memory.
The assumption of risk doctrine is further ill-suited to clickstream
data since a Net user seldom knows the type or extent of data being col-
lected by Web sites or ISPs. 6 In addition, clickstream data is often
unwillingly exposed. Recent studies indicate that the majority of Net
users dislike clickstream data collection by online companies. 67 It is logi-
cally infirm to hold that a person surrenders his or her expectation of
privacy in clickstream data when he or she neither knows nor intends to
expose such information to public view. As Justice Marshall explained
in his dissent in Smith, "[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is
some notion of choice." ' Application of the assumption of risk principle
to involuntary data collection is contrary to the values the Fourth
Amendment was intended to protect.
9
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text, explaining that clickstream data collection
often occurs without the user's knowledge.
67. A recent study by AT&T found that an overwhelming majority of Web users par-
ticularly disliked automated data collection services which provided them with no notice that
data was being collected as they surfed the Net. AT&T online press release: Survey: 'One-
Size-Fits-All' Privacy Won't Work on 'Net (last modified April 14, 1999) <http:ll
wwwresearch.att.com/projects/privacystudy/press.htm> ("Users dislike automatic data trans-
fer and unsolicited communications. When asked about possible browser features that would
make it easier to provide information to a Web site, 86 percent reported no interest in doing so
without their taking some action."). See also Bob Tedeschi, Targeted Marketing Confronts
Privacy Concerns, N.Y. TIMEs (last modified May 10, 1999) <http://
www.nytimes.comllibraryltech/99/05/cyber/commerce/locommerce.html> ("[Rlecent surveys
indicat[e] that Internet users are increasingly uncomfortable with the amount of personal data
gathered by online companies, and as online companies become more aggressive about col-
lecting that information."); Federal Trade Commission Staff Report: Online Privacy: General
Practices and Concerns, supra note 9 ("Survey results suggest that although many individuals
are willing to strike a balance between maintaining personal privacy and obtaining the infor-
mation and services that new interactive technologies provide, they are concerned about
potential misuse of their personal information and want meaningful and effective protection of
that information. In the 1994 Harris Survey, fifty-one percent of respondents stated they
would be concerned if an interactive service to which they subscribed engaged in 'subscriber
profiling,' i.e., the creation of individual profiles based upon subscribers' usage and purchase
patterns, in order to advertise to subscribers.").
68. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. As one commentator warns, "The Katz decision... included limiting language
which specified that a person could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in things that
were 'knowingly expose[d] to the public.' ... The Supreme Court has used the 'knowing
exposure' rationale to transform the reasonable expectation of privacy standard into a simple
assumption of risk test.... In its evolved form, the Katz privacy test has become a roadblock
to fourth amendment protection instead of a roadmap for ensuring it. It strips the individual of
a great measure of fourth amendment protection-the single most important characteristic
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Nonetheless, there are indications that courts will apply the subjec-
tive expectation of privacy and assumption of risk principles to
clickstream data. As discussed above, these principles have already been
applied to email, chat room postings, and sign-up information provided
to ISPs. The only court to thus far address expectations of privacy in
clickstream data held that a Web user lacked an expectation of privacy in
clickstream data generated while at work since he had notice that his
Internet usage was being monitored. In United States v. Simons,70 the
Fourth Circuit considered whether an employee retained a legitimate
expectation of privacy in records of his Internet use from work in light
of a policy implemented by his employer, the Foreign Bureau of Infor-
mation Services,7 which warned employees that all Internet activity in
the workplace would be monitored and recorded .7 Applying the tradi-
tional two-prong Katz test, the court concluded that the policy stripped
the defendant of any expectation of privacy by putting him on notice that
his online activity was not private:
Simons did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with re-
gard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS
Internet policy.... The policy placed employees on notice that
they could not reasonably expect that their Internet activity
would be private. Therefore, regardless of whether Simons sub-
jectively believed that the files he transferred from the Internet
were private, such a belief was not objectively reasonable after
FBIS notified him that it would be overseeing his Internet use.73
Simons is frightening because it could potentially be read as elimi-
nating an expectation of privacy in clickstream data whenever the user
knows or should know that his or her clickstream is being monitored. As
discussed above, the rapid development of data tracking technology and
data mining practices make it virtually inevitable that the capacity will
soon exist to monitor and record all online activity. As this technology
becomes commonplace, so too will public knowledge of its use. In such
which distinguishes a free society from a police state-simply as a result of living in a high-
tech society. Its result is to strip the fourth amendment of its normative values which were
intended to regulate and limit the powers of government." Lewis R. Katz, In Search of A
Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 564 (1990).
70. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
71. The FBIS is a division of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 395.
72. Id at 395-96.
73. Id. at 398 (emphasis added). See also United States v. Monroe, 52 M.J. 326
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (acknowledging that military serviceman retained legitimate expectation of
privacy in email while it was in transmission, but holding that he lacked expectation of pri-
vacy in email stored in electronic mailbox on government Internet server when government
computer use policy warned him that his account was subject to monitoring).
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a world, Simons could be read for the proposition that a Net user enjoys
no expectation of privacy in clickstream data.
Such a broad reading of Simons is improper. Importantly, a govern-
ment agency was defendant Simons' employer; in light of the Internet
use policy, Simons was knowingly and voluntarily exposing his click-
stream data directly to the government.74 Furthermore, Simons does not
stand for the proposition that the government can place the clickstream
data of non-government employees beyond the reach of the Fourth
Amendment merely by announcing that it is subject to monitoring. As
the Supreme Court explained in Smith, a nationwide announcement by
the government proclaiming that all homes are henceforth subject to
warrantless entry would not defeat a homeowner's legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy. s In addition, even if Simons establishes that Web users
who know that their clickstreams are monitored lack a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy, this is not necessarily fatal to a legitimate
expectation of privacy.76
III. ESTABLISHING A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
IN CLICKSTREAM DATA
Unfortunately, the doctrinal basis for finding an expectation of pri-
vacy in clickstream data is far from clear. As discussed above,
application to the Internet of contemporary expectation of privacy juris-
prudence might well lead courts to conclude that Net users lack an
74. The fact that ISPs and online businesses are collecting clickstream data instead of the
government may ultimately require a defendant to establish that these actors are government
agents in order to obtain suppression. That issue is beyond the scope of this article.
75. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) ("Situations can be imagined,
of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on na-
tionwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding
their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of
this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his
telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls
might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations
had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a 'legitimate expec-
tation of privacy' existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper.")
76. Web users can retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in some instances even in
the absence of a subjective expectation of privacy. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5. See also
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n. 7 (1984) (noting that Supreme Court has always
emphasized objective over subjective prong of Katz test).
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expectation of privacy in clickstream data. Such a result is clearly incor-
rect.
Courts foraying into cyberspace must shift their focus away from the
two-prong Katz expectation of privacy test in order to preserve the val-
ues underlying the Fourth Amendment. In developing a new framework
for expectation of privacy analysis in cyberspace, courts should focus on
the historic context of the Fourth Amendment and the intent of its Fram-
ers. Government monitoring and analysis of clickstream data is closely
analogous to the general searches which the Framers sought to curtail in
enacting the Fourth Amendment. Both types of searches are indiscrimi-
nate, exposing lawful activity along with contraband or unlawful action.
Both are also incredibly intrusive, exposing intimate details about the
lives of citizens to government scrutiny. A new rule needs to be estab-
lished which recognizes that clickstream data may be protected by the
Fourth Amendment, not because that protection fits well with expecta-
tion of privacy analysis as developed by the Court in recent years, but
rather because government clickstream analysis is precisely the type of
search the Framers intended to be subject to the Amendment's limita-
tions.
Courts addressing this question should apply the normative analysis
set forth by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland instead of the rigid
two-prong Katz test. The Court in Smith recognized that the two-prong
Katz expectation of privacy test will sometimes provide "an inadequate
index of Fourth Amendment protection."77 In such situations, the Court
explained, courts must undertake a normative inquiry to determine
whether Fourth Amendment protection was appropriate.7 This norma-
tive inquiry asks a very simple question: should an individual in a free
and open society be forced to assume the risk that the government will
monitor her as she engages in the activity at issue 9 Courts employing
the normative inquiry "must evaluate the 'intrinsic character' of investi-
gative practices with reference to the basic values underlying the Fourth
Amendment."' Unlike the two-prong test, which assumes that society
has already reached an objective conclusion about the proper amount of
77. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741 n.5.
78. Id.
79. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 750-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 220 n.5 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy determination "necessarily focuses on personal interests in privacy and liberty
recognized by a free society"); Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto-Rico Telephone Co., 110 F.3d 174,
180 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997) ("In cases in which notice would contradict expectations that comport
with traditional Fourth Amendment freedoms, a normative inquiry is proper to determine
whether the privacy expectation is nonetheless legitimate.").
80. 442 U.S. at 750-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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protection a particular activity deserves, the normative test acknowl-
edges that society has not reached a consensus about the proper level of
protection a certain activity warrants. In that case, the activity can be
evaluated against constitutional norms.81
Application of Smith's normative inquiry to clickstreams reveals that
Net users should retain an expectation of privacy in clickstreams because
this data is precisely the type of information the Framers sought to pro-
tect against arbitrary government intrusion.2 The Fourth Amendment
was intended to limit government searches which held the potential to
intrude into the intimate details of the private lives of citizens; courts
must recognize a legitimate expectation of privacy in the intimate rec-
ords of our online activity in order to satisfy these constitutional norms.
The passage of the Fourth Amendment was the Framers' reaction to
overly intrusive searches and seizures conducted by British and colonial
authorities. Prior to the Amendment's passage, the colonists were
plagued by the use of general warrants and writs of assistance which
authorized law and customs enforcement officers to enter and search any
building suspected of housing contraband.3 The searches conducted
81. See also Keeping Secrets, supra note 23, at 1607 ("The truth is that the application of
Katz to new technology is simultaneously normative and descriptive. Deciding which expec-
tations of privacy are reasonable is not simply an empirical determination, but rather requires
a judgment about the kind of society in which we want to live; in determining 'reasonable
expectations,' we cannot divorce the level of privacy that the Constitution does protect from a
judgment about how much privacy our society ought to protect. The Fourth Amendment bal-
ances the individual's claim to privacy against the societal demand for effective law
enforcement.") (citations omitted).
82. Although discussion of the types of searches and seizures the Fourth Amendment is
intended to cover is typically undertaken as part of the "reasonableness" inquiry, see, e.g.,
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995), it would clearly be improper to deny a defen-
dant the opportunity to raise a Fourth Amendment defense to a search of the type the Framers
intended to prohibit merely because courts have developed a Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence which is ill-suited to a new communications technology.
83. General warrants allowed authorities to conduct searches and seizures without par-
ticularized suspicion as to place or contraband. See NELSON LAssON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AIENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 26
(1976) (describing content and service of general warrants: "Persons and places were not
necessarily specified, seizure of papers and effects was indiscriminate, everything was left to
the discretion of the bearer of the warrant."). Writs of assistance, designed to help enforce
customs laws, were even more intrusive than general warrants since they typically granted
officers unlimited discretion in conducting searches and seizures. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGI-
NAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 227 (1988) (detailing 'writs of assistance'
which gave customs agents and law enforcement officials broad power to search for and seize
any untaxed goods, and explaining that these warrants lasted for the life of the sovereign and
could be used without any showing of particularized suspicion); Barbara C. Salken, The Gen-
eral Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked
Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 17 PACE L. REv. 97, 144 (1997) ("Writs of assis-
tance were used extensively in the colonies in the 1760s and were a principal irritant to the
colonists. The writs were even more offensive than the general warrants, which had at least
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using these devices were broad and abusive, occurred without particu-
larized suspicion and were led by executive officials with unlimited
discretion. 4 For example, the New Hampshire Council once allowed
search warrants for "all houses, warehouses, and elsewhere in this
Province"; the Pennsylvania Council once required a weapons search of
"every house in Philadelphia." '85 Far from being isolated instances, such
searches were widespread.86
In response to these abuses, the Framers sought to limit the power of
government actors to search or seize persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fectsY8 The invasion the Framers sought to prohibit was not merely the
been directed at the perpetrators of a particular offense; writs of assistance permitted unlim-
ited discretion and... were designed to prevent the American colonies from trading outside
the Empire."). One scholar has suggested that the widespread use of writs of assistance was
the prime cause of the American Revolution. See Salken, supra at 144-45 ("The relationship
of the revolution to the writs is clear. John Adams, who had been a young courtroom spectator
during the argument in the writs-of-assistance case, later, wrote: 'Mr. Otis' oration against the
Writs of Assistance breathed into this nation the breath of life. [H]e was a flame of fire. Every
man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against
writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of
Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years, namely in 1776,
he grew to manhood, and declared himself free.'") (citations omitted).
84. William J. Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle: Ori-
gins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371,
372 (1980) (explaining that colonists were subject to forcible intrusion by British officials
acting under authority of general warrants and writs of assistance); Phoebe Weaver Williams,
Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analysis of Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 8
HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 39 (1990) ("During the period when the English were struggling to free
themselves from indiscriminate searches, the American colonists were being subjected to
broad and abusive searches.").
85. Tracey Maclin, Informants and The Fourth Amendment: A Reconsideration, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 573, 583 (1996) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 581 ("The general warrant, or something resembling it, was the usual protocol
of search and arrest everywhere in colonial America, excepting Massachusetts after 1756.");
Levy, supra note 83, at 224 (noting that 106 of the 108 warrants issued in period of 1700-
1763 were general warrants).
87. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The purpose
of these clear and precise words [in the Fourth Amendment] was to guarantee to the people of
this Nation that they should forever be secure from the general searches and unrestrained
seizures that had been a hated hallmark of colonial rule under the notorious writs of assistance
of the British Crown."); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) ("These words [of the
Fourth Amendment] are precise and clear. They reflect the determination of those who wrote
the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should forever 'be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects' from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled
authority of a general warrant. Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans
were those general warrants known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown
had so bedeviled the colonists."). See also, Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 84, at 372 (stating
that the Fourth Amendment's protections "arose from the harsh experience of householders
having their doors hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. In-
deed, the Fourth Amendment is explainable only by the history and memory of such abuse");
Williams, supra note 84, at 39 ("The fourth amendment was the Framers' response to broad
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physical intrusion upon a "person" or "house." Instead, "the amend-
ment's opposition to unreasonable intrusion ... sprang from a popular
opposition to the surveillance and divulgement that intrusion made pos-
sible.""3 As one scholar explained, "[t]he objectionable feature of general
warrants was their indiscriminate character."9 In addition to any contra-
band or unstamped goods that the generalized searches uncovered, the
entirety of a person's private life was exposed to prying government
eyes. This sort of indiscriminate search stripped the colonists of privacy
without adequate justification, exposing them to the arbitrary and poten-
tially despotic acts of government officials."
Monitoring and analysis of clickstreams by government officials is
closely analogous to colonial general searches because it exposes the
intimate lives of Web users, fails to discriminate between lawful and
unlawful activity, and grants enormous discretion to front-line executive
officials. As with general searches of colonial homes, clickstream
searches will unnecessarily reveal private information to government
view, even when this information pertains to lawful activity. For exam-
ple, law enforcement agents monitoring clickstreams could learn that an
outwardly heterosexual man spends time entertaining homosexual fanta-
sies online in an adult chat room, or that a high-profile political leader
used the Internet to reserve a spot in an addiction recovery center.9'
While such conduct is certainly legal, it is also intensely private. Al-
lowing government agents to expose the conduct of the innocent in order
to pursue the guilty contradicts the purpose and intent of the Fourth
Amendment.9
and abusive searches conducted by the British government."); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure
for the Fourth Amendment Is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 1, 11-13 (1994)
(arguing that the Fourth Amendment was the framers' reaction to a historical period where
government actors demonstrated little respect for individual privacy).
88. William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 602,
1546 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School).
89. Salken, supra note 83, at 145. See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
467 (1971) (acknowledging that colonist's chief objection to general warrants was "not that of
the intrusion per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings").
90. See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349,411 (1974).
91. The litany of potential abuses is limitless since the proliferation of Web sites and
services now allows Web users to engage in virtually any activity online. The development of
online voting for political office highlights the danger of an indiscriminate clickstream search:
law enforcement officers analyzing a suspect's clickstream might well learn the way he or she
voted in a cyber-election. See Arizona Democrats (visited May 15, 2000) <http:ll
www.azdem.orglbreakdown.html> (describing first binding Internet election in Arizona's
Democratic presidential primary in which 35,765 people cast official votes online).
92. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("By the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police action to legal re-
straints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the innocent.").
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On a more general level, the broad and arbitrary intrusion occa-
sioned by a clickstream search is contrary to "the most basic values
underlying the Fourth Amendment." Although the use of general war-
rants and writs of assistance undoubtedly motivated the Framers in
drafting the Amendment, they did not intend its protection to be limited
to the narrow purpose of outlawing general searches.93 Instead, the
Amendment was intended to protect citizens against the type of arbitrary
invasions by government into the lives of citizens which general
searches typified.94 As one commentator explained:
While the history of the Fourth Amendment reveals many facets,
one central aspect of that history is pervasive: controlling the
discretion of government officials to invade the privacy and se-
curity of citizens, whether that discretion be directed toward the
homes and offices of political dissentients, illegal smugglers, or
ordinary criminals.95
Similarly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the
harm the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent is not the tangible inva-
93. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing) ("[W]hat the Framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed ... were general
searches.... [T]hese various forms of authority led in practice to 'virtually unrestrained,' and
hence 'general,' searches. To be sure, the Fourth Amendment, in the Warrant Clause, prohib-
its by name only searches by general warrants. But that was only because the abuses of the
general warrant were particularly vivid in the minds of the Framers' generation, and not be-
cause the Framers viewed other kinds of general searches as any less unreasonable.")
(citations omitted); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) ("But while the Fourth
Amendment was most immediately the product of contemporary revulsion against a regime of
writs of assistance, its roots go far deeper. Its adoption in the Constitution of this new Nation
reflected the culmination in England a few years earlier of a struggle against oppression which
had endured for centuries."). See also Maclin, supra note 85, at 582 ("The newly emerging
'Americanization' of the right against unreasonable search and seizure was not confined to
rejection of the general warrant. Other types of intrusion were also deemed unreasonable. For
example, nocturnal searches were universally condemned... Unannounced entries were also
denounced.").
94. Numerous scholars have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was prefaced on the
broad purpose of protecting citizens against arbitrary governmental intrusion on personal
privacy. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 85, at 584-85 ("Although it did not explicitly outlaw all
discretionary searches and seizures, the [Fourth] Amendment initiated and symbolized an
ideal that was uniquely American - discretionary invasions of privacy and personal security,
whether by warrant or without, violated constitutional liberty... [W]e should remember that
the Fourth Amendment was designed to check the discretionary power of government to in-
vade individual privacy and security"); Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MaM. L. REv.
483, 528 (1995) ("The core complaint of the colonists was not that searches and seizures were
warranted, warrantless, or unauthorized actions; it was the general, suspicionless nature of the
searches and seizures.... As they sought to regulate searches and seizures, the framers held
certain principles to be fundamental, of which particularized suspicion was in the first rank.").
95. Maclin, supra note 85, at 585 n.53.
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sion of one's person, papers, effects, or home, but rather the intangible
invasion upon the sanctity and privacy of those objects occasioned by an
unreasonable search or seizure.96
The indiscriminate nature of clickstream searches illustrates their in-
compatibility with the values upon which the Fourth Amendment was
based. As one scholar argued:
The first [problem with indiscriminate searches] is that they ex-
pose people and their possessions to interferences by
government when there is no good reason to do so. The concern
here is against unjustified searches and seizures: it rests upon the
principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his person
and property unless and until an adequate justification for dis-
turbing that security is shown. The second [problem] is that
indiscriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the
discretion of executive officials, who may act despotically and
capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize.
This latter concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures;
it condemns the petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers. 97
96. An arbitrary or excessive intrusion upon personal sanctity and privacy by govern-
ment officials was widely considered the hallmark of an unreasonable search and seizure at
the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1885), the Court explained that the values underlying the Fourth Amendment were shaped by
English common law, particularly Lord Camden's opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1029 (1765), stating:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security.... Mhey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employ-
ees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaing of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private prop-
erty, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,--it is
the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment.
116 U.S. at 630. The Court emphasized that these principles were in the forefront of the
minds of the Framers when the Fourth Amendment was drafted.
As every American statesman during out revolutionary and formative period as a
nation was undoubtedly familiar with this monument of English freedom, and con-
sidered it as the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law, it may be
confidently asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those who framed the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and were considered as sufficiently ex-
planatory of what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures.
Id. at 626. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials"); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
726 (1969) ("Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry.").
97. Amsterdam, supra note 90, at 411.
1999-2000]
88 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Absent an expectation of privacy in clickstream data, law enforce-
ment agents will be free to rummage through our online lives, revealing
intensely private conduct. The Framers found the ability to conduct such
arbitrary and suspicionless searches to be one of the most offensive as-
pects of general warrants and writs of assistance, 8 and clearly intended
such searches to be illegal.99 Allowing such intrusions into private cyber-
space activity merely because an outdated expectation of privacy test
would find assumption of risk or the absence of a subjective expectation
of privacy in clickstream data does intense violence to the values un-
derlying both the Fourth Amendment and a free society.' °° Yet this is
exactly the result that will be reached if courts continue to cling to
Katz's two part test.
Once an expectation of privacy is established in clickstream data,
traditional Fourth Amendment principles regulating the reasonableness
of searches and seizures can easily be applied. The traditional test of rea-
sonableness, which balances the nature and quality of the intrusion upon
an individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of
the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion,01 is perfectly
suited for cyberspace. This test allows courts to protect against overly
extensive and indiscriminate intrusion into our online lives while also
acknowledging that a sufficiently compelling governmental interest may
justify such searches. This is the question that should be getting asked in
every clickstream search; however, it will never be asked until courts
loosen their vise grip on the two-prong Katz test and decide that Internet
users should retain a legitimate expectation of privacy in clickstream
data.
98. Lasson, supra note 84, at 26 (explaining that with general warrants, "everything was
left to the discretion of the bearer of the warrant"); Salken, supra note 83, at 144 (explaining
that writs of assistance granted their bearers "unlimited discretion" in conducting searches and
seizures).
99. Macin, supra note 85, at 579 (arguing that the framers intended "general searches
and seizures [to be] illegal on their face").
100. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("[T]he security of one's privacy against
arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a
free society.").
101. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1985); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696,703 (1983).
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